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In exchange economies where moral hazard a¤ects the distribution of individ-
ual risks, we study the viability of linear nonexclusive contracts. It is shown that
the linearity in prices and payo¤s is compatible with the presence of moral hazard
when coupled with a simple taxation scheme. More speci…cally, we prove exis-
tence of competitive equilibrium. The taxation scheme can be seen as a form of
sharing the pro…ts and losses in a mutual insurance arrangement. The contracts
can be given the more general interpretation of …nancial assets in markets where
the unveri…ability of trades is widespread. The asset prices are such that hedging
opportunities may be ‘incomplete’ at equilibrium.
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21. Introduction.
The traditional view of moral hazard in economics has been that this kind of
asymmetric information cannot be dealt with by competitive markets. Indeed,
Helpman and La¤ont [8] showed that competitive insurance markets under moral
hazard could collapse. Later work on insurance under adverse selection or more
generally on exchange under moral hazard concentrated on exclusive and nonlin-
ear contracts (Rothschild and Stiglitz [13] and Grossman and Hart [7] are two
signi…cative examples among the many).
Only recently attention has been devoted to mechanisms that would allow
nonexclusive and potentially linear contracts to be exchanged without su¤ering
the notorious e¤ects of private asymmetric information. The interest in this form
of contracts stems from the realistic assumption that in many settings more elab-
orate, nonlinear contracts are not feasible because trades are not observable or,
more appropriately, not veri…able by a third party (a court or an arbiter). This
restriction on contracting is akin to what assumed in the incomplete contracts
literature.
In the papers where this issue has so far been tackled (Bisin and Gottardi
[3], Minelli and Polemarchakis [11]) the solution to the moral hazard problem is
found to be the institutional arrangement of limiting the informed party’s market
participation. If the informed party is limited to buying or selling only, and if
he can be on the other side of the market only through a ‘pooling’ asset, then
competitive markets function even in the presence of moral hazard.1 The pool-
ing asset is a security that combines the claims of all individuals belonging to
the same risk category ex ante, but to many categories of risk (generated by an
unobservable action which only the individual exerting it knows) at the interim
stage, eliminating most of the risks through the workings of a law of large num-
bers.2 This way, trade can occur at competitive prices, although these prices are
not completely free from arbitrage. Bisin and Gottardi in particular show that
these one-side constraints work as a minimal form of nonlinearity, as they can be
translated into a system of bid-ask spreads.
In this paper, we develop an alternative to one-side constraints: under condi-
1As a matter of fact, these authors study the general case covering both adverse selection
and moral hazard at the same time.
2One should note the similarity between the moral hazard and default problems. Both the
problem in terms of contractual incompleteness and its solution through one-side constraints
and pooling are common features of the two setups (for default, see Dubey, Geanakoplos and
Shubik [6]).
3tions of limited asset payo¤s relative to the size of the individuals’ endowments,
taxes and transfers (or participation fees) can be set so to solve the feasibility
problem in a moral hazard setup. We adopt payments which are settled in ad-
vance even in the case the individual decides not to trade in equilibrium.3 In fact,
these taxes are tantamount to a redistribution of pro…ts and losses deriving from
the workings of the market. This redistribution is endogenously determined at
the equilibrium, and is independent of the e¤ort chosen by the individuals. The
taxation system does not eliminate the possibility of manipulation, in the sense
that it does not separate individuals according to their risk category (the chosen
e¤ort level); however, it mitigates the moral hazard e¤ects in the sense that it
guarantees feasibility of exchanges.
As it is well known, the word ‘insurance’ applied to our model has a broader
functional, and not just an institutional, meaning. However, the institutional
meaning corresponds to the model’s main interpretation. Then, our proposed
arrangement could take place in mutual insurance. The insurees are members of
the insurance and there is no limited liability. This model interpretation extends
the analysis of mutual insurance in Cass et al.[5] to a moral hazard setting. Alter-
natively, the insurance should be thought of as a public agency and participation
should be mandatory; the fees then would correspond to taxes (resp. subsidies)
which arise from the losses (resp. pro…ts) of the agency. When taxes are individ-
ually rational, as in the last sections of the paper, they can also be interpreted as
two-part-tari¤ contracts o¤ered by an insurance company.
Although the main interpretation of the model is in the institutional insurance
context, it is not di¢cult to relabel variables to think of the ‘insurance company’
as an organized exchange of …nancial contracts or ‘market maker’, and of the
insurees as ‘informed traders’. Once again, it is especially in this context that
limited observability of individual trades may make the search for linear and
nonexclusive arrangements plausible for an optimizing agent (in this case, the
exchange or market maker).
To achieve these results, we develop a model of an exchange economy with in-
dividual risks, where agents can a¤ect the probability distribution over the states
of the world, and exchange …nancial contracts whose payo¤s depend on the indi-
3But see our discussion in Section 5.1. Bisin and Gottardi [3] also suggested an alternative
solution to the feasibility problem of competitive …nancial markets with moral hazard. Indeed,
in Bisin and Gottardi it is conjectured that entry fees could be a substitute for minimal nonlinear
pricing. Their solution also entails a form of two-part tari¤, where the …xed fee is paid only if
the individual trades.
4vidual realization of uncertainty. This is the basic framework used by Helpman
and La¤ont [8], and later by the other above-mentioned authors.4 Our twist con-
sists in studying the speci…c arrangement of taxes (fees) within this framework.
We …rst of all show existence of equilibrium with moral hazard and linear prices
(and payo¤s) when participation fees are introduced while asset payo¤s are lim-
ited relative to the size of the individuals’ endowments. No further restrictions or
bounds on …nancial trades are imposed, also a technical di¤erence with respect to
previous work. This di¤erence is important from a cognitive viewpoint. If there is
limited trade observability, bounds on individual trade may not be imposed and
enforced on individuals.
In general, in our equilibrium asset prices are not equal to the actuarially
fair value of (discounted) payo¤s. This property implies that, again generally,
participation fees correspond to a form of cross-subsidization between high-e¤ort
and low-e¤ort individuals, and thatinsurance opportunities are incomplete. Tosee
this, recall that in the standard insurance markets with no asymmetric information
the competitive equilibrium premium equals the actuarially fair value of losses. At
this price, and assuming S possible individual states of the world, S¡1 insurance
contracts are enough to provide the individual with full insurance opportunities.
When the premium is not equal to this fair value, S ¡1 contracts are not enough
to provide full insurance to the individual. That is, an unfair premium is a form
of imperfection to which individuals react by purchasing less than full insurance.
Insurance opportunities are therefore (endogenously) incomplete.
Beside showing existence of equilibrium, we begin to compare previously stud-
ied equilibria (in particular, with one-side constraints) and our participation fee
equilibria. While in our current setup the former institutional arrangement always
gives rise to no trade equilibria, the participation fee equilibrium does involve trade
but some agents pay something similar to a tax on their (no trade) endowment.
In the case of one commodity, we show that for any given equilibrium level of
e¤ort a participation fee equilibrium is individually rational and no worse than
an equilibrium with one-side constraints.
In the …nal sections of the paper we also explore some other properties of
equilibria with participation fees, speci…cally their regularity. We examine to
what extent …nancial markets are active and if there is a relation with entry fee
equilibria, i.e., equilibria where the individual pays a …xed fee only if he decides
to trade. We …nd that typically, that is, for an open and dense subset of (state-
4Indeed, the model had been also elaborated for exclusive contracts …rst by Prescott and
Townsend [12].
5and e¤ort-dependent) utilities, costs of e¤ort and endowments, at least one group
of individuals is trading on …nancial markets. We also show that, with virtually
no substantial change, existence with entry fees follows from the same logic of the
taxes and transfers proof.
2. Set-up of the model.
2.1. Individuals, commodities and uncertainty
There are H types of individuals denoted by subscript h and a continuum of ex
ante identical individuals for each type of Lebesgue measure normalized to one.5
Each individual is then a pair (h;n), with h 2 H; and n 2 [0;1].
Two interpretations can be given of this economy. Either we can think of h as
a village containing identical individuals n, that is, replicas of the same kind of
people; or we can think of n as a village and H as the di¤erent types of individuals
(professions, say, or social classes) all living in the same village. In what follows,
we use the …rst interpretation, although obviously the two interpretations are
formally equivalent.
There are C physical commodities. Each individual of type h has real wealth
represented by an endowment of the physical commodities which is uncertain but
publicly observable. The individual agent can a¤ect the probability distribution
over his own endowment by exerting an action ah 2 Ah; a set of …nite dimension K.
This action is assumed to be unobservable, or noncontractable for whatever other




++: De…ne A ´ £H
h=1Ah:
All ex ante identical units of each type are assumed to be ex post di¤erent only
with respect to the endowment realization and the chosen level of e¤ort, and to
have preferences which depend directly only on their own endowment uncertainty.
We are going to model endowment uncertainty at the individual level as idiosyn-
cratic risk. Let e
sh
h 2 RC
++ denote the endowment in state sh for an individual
of type h; and sh = 1;:::;Sh < 1: Each state sh represents an individual-speci…c
shock, which may be independent and is identically distributed across individuals.
Let S = £H
h=1Sh. Because we will look at markets which treat these individuals
symmetrically, aggregate or social states (as functions from [0;1]
H into S) are
equivalent if they correspond to the same frequencies of endowment levels for
5Alternatively, one could study the limit of …nite economies as the number of individuals in
each group tends to in…nity. See comments below on the Law of Large Numbers.
6each type, an argument similar to Malinvaud’s [10]. Frequencies will be taken as
given by individuals, and no uncertainty will be derived at the aggregate level.
Additional aggregate uncertainty can be accomodated, but it is irrelevant for the









be the probability distribution over individual states for
type h given e¤ort level k; and let ¼h = (¼h
1;¼h




++ the consumption in individual state sh by type h individuals.
De…ne also (x
sh
h )sh = xh; (xh)
H
h=1 = x:
First, we impose standard restrictions on probabilities, that is, …rst order
stochastic dominance of the high-level e¤ort over the low-level, and on endow-
ments, assumptions that will be used to create the moral hazard interpretation.
Assumption 1 (stochastic dominance and risky endowments)
(i) For any k = 1;2; ¼k







s=1 ¼s = 1
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for all s 2 Sh; with strict inequality for some s. Let ¦h be the set of such
vectors ¼h:
(ii) For all h; eh 2 R
CSh





h if sh 6= s0
h.
Since K = 2 by assumption, without loss of generality we can take a1 < a2. Also,
de…ne ¦ = £H




++ as the subset of endowments satisfying
Assumption 1.ii.
2.2. Preferences
We assume that individual utilities are von Neumann - Morgenstern functions
over individual state-contingent consumption lotteries, with associated Bernoulli
utilities which are state-independent, separable in e¤ort6, exhibiting risk aversion
and satisfying standard smooth assumptions.
6Only in Proposition 4.2, Bernoulli utilities will be allowed to be state and e¤ort dependent.
7Assumption 2 (risk-aversion) The utility function for a type-h individual is
Uh : Ah £ R
2CSh














h ) ¡ a
k
h;
and where uh : RC
++ ! R is C2, di¤erentially strictly increasing, di¤erentially
strictly concave, with closure of indi¤erence surfaces contained in RC
++.
Note the absence of consumption at period zero, in line with Helpman and La¤ont
[8]. Call Uh the set of the above-de…ned utility functions uh and also U = £H
h=1
Uh. We endow it with the C2 compact-open topology.
2.3. Individual risk and aggregate behavior
Once we …x the proportion of units of type h who choose e¤ort level k, denoted
by µ
k
h, the frequency of endowment level sh, f
sh













h is the frequency of endowment level sh given e¤ort level ak
h.
Note that for given e¤ort level ak
h, the probability ¼
shk
h is also the frequency
f
shk
h as a consequence of the presence of a continuum of individuals for each type
and of the Law of Large Numbers (see Uhlig [15], or Al-Najjar [2]). Therefore f
shk
h
is given as a primitive of the economy. Note also that using a continuum of agents
in each group guarantees consistency of price-taking behavior on the commodity
market, but does not yield proper market clearing conditions, e¤ective at every
realization of uncertainty, rather only on (L2¡) average. The interpretation à
la Malinvaud based on limit economies would result in e¤ective market clearing
almost always, since in that case we could use Kolmogorov’s Strong Law of Large
Numbers. However, in either way in any large but …nite economy we would




h will be determined in equilibrium, individuals take it as given,
as they do with future spot commodity prices. This entails a stronger notion of
rational expectations. From the individual viewpoint the frequency f
sh
h is also
given and unique, hence in the economy there is absence of aggregate risk, as we
said.
8Because of this, the commodity price vector is denoted by p 2 RC
++ ; and is
assumed to be independent of the individual realization of uncertainty.
2.4. Financial assets
We assume that individuals have access to …nancial hedging instruments which
are ‘competitive’ and nonexclusive, instead of being nonlinear exclusive contracts.
This assumption is for example justi…ed when it is too costly to obtain information
on trades in order to write a nonlinear contract for each individual.
Because of the absence of aggregate risk and of consumption at time zero,
we assume without loss of generality that the only …nancial assets that can be
traded in equilibrium are mutual insurances. These are …nancial contracts that
are signed by individuals inside each type or group h of individuals, and therefore
are designed to insure individuals against the individual risk of type h. In essence,
this is group insurance either based on geographical location (using the …rst inter-
pretation of h as village), or on profession (second interpretation). Obviously the
term ‘insurance’ is used here broadly in its functional sense, which includes but
is not limited to the commonly used, institutional sense. In particular, we claim
that the model covers contracts such as credit cards and other forms of securitized
loans, where again a law of large numbers can be used to o¤set conditionally in-
dependent risks. The issue of course is whether the presence of moral hazard, as
well as other forms of incomplete contractability, such as adverse selection (not
directly addressed here) or reneging and default, is compatible with a simple,
anonymous formulation of these contracts.
There are Ih mutual insurance contracts for each h. The net payo¤ if state
sh occurs is given by r
i;sh
h ¡ qi
h for i = 1;2;:::;Ih. Here qi
h can be thought of
as the ‘premium’ of insurance contract i in group h. Let Rh(qh) be the Sh £ Ih
dimensional matrix of net payo¤s, and Rh the matrix of gross payo¤s. Payo¤s and
premia are expressed in units of the last good. Finally, let bh be the asset holdings
of an individual in group h. Although here we talk about mutual insurance, it is
possible to think of these contracts as o¤ered by an insurance as an independent
intermediary.
Assumption 3 (i) Ih · Sh¡1; (ii) ri





h for some sh;s0
h 2 Sh
with sh 6= s0
h; and (iii) rank of Rh is Ih; and 1 = 2< Rh >.
Assumptions (i) and (iii) are imposed because otherwise an equilibrium will
not exist due to the impossibility of …nding no arbitrage prices qh, and so in
9this sense are imposed without loss of generality. They will be necessary but not
su¢cient for equilibrium. Assumption (iii) readily implies that if rank of Rh is Ih;
then so is the rank of Rh(qh).
2.5. Equilibrium
The timing of the model is simple. First, each individual signs an insurance
contract which requires payment of a premium tomorrow, after uncertainty is
resolved. Then the individual chooses a level of e¤ort ah: Individual uncertainty
is resolved and a state sh arises for each individual. After receiving insurance
payments and paying the insurance premium, individuals trade commodities and
consume.
Strictly speaking, the classical moral hazard problem arises for the subset of
economies where endowments are increasing with sh, and r
sh;i
h decreases with sh.
Individuals have the possibility of exerting high e¤ort (k = 2); increasing the
probability of better states (under Assumption 1.i), and decreasing the insurance
payments, but pay the cost of such an action. If the insurance contract is o¤ered
at a low premium matching the high e¤ort chosen by the individual, i.e., low
risk, then the individuals can increase risks once insured. More generally, the
presence of unobservable actions creates the possibility of manipulation, which in
our context may lead to nonexistence of equilibrium.
Equilibrium corresponds to optimization and consistency requirements on ex-
pectations and the use of resources.
Regarding optimization, the objective of each individual is to choose an insur-
ance coverage and an e¤ort, and then to consume in order to maximize his utility.
Individual h ’s maximization problem is
maxah;xh;bh Uh(ah;xh)
s:t (xh;bh) 2 B(eh;rh;qh;p);ah 2 Ah
(2.1)
for given qh (and rh;eh); where B(eh;rh;qh;p) represents the opportunity set of
individual h. The institutional rules about the use of the …nancial contracts will
determine the kind of B(:) each individual faces, and the kind of equilibrium we
consider.
Second, as for consistency of expectations we need to make the individual e¤ort




h represents the proportion of
individuals choosing e¤ort k, and it is an endogenous quantity, an equilibrium
must require that µ
k
h be equal to one (zero) if the corresponding e¤ort dominates
10(is dominated by) the other at given prices, and that µ
k
h be in between only if
both e¤orts are utility-maximizing choices for each individual in group h.















subject to the constraints B(eh;rh;qh;p) and Ah; with choice variables again in-
dexed by k; where the superscript k denotes the choice conditional on the e¤ort
level k = 1;2: This is coherent with the standard natural way of solving problem
2.1, that is (i) to solve it with respect to (xh;bh) for …xed ak








which gives the highest value of the objective function.
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h ) 0 · µ
2
h · 1; for all h:
(2.3)























These conditions (optimization and consistency) do not always guarantee that an
equilibrium exists and that insurance markets clear, unless we specify the exact
form of B(:) and we possibly add other institutional arrangements in the insurance
markets.
This has nothing to do with the multiplicity of assets and commodities, for
the existence problem arises even when H = 1; C = 1 and I = 1; as shown




h = 0 (overly restrictive in our economies, because generally it may force no
trade), does not necessarily imply market clearing in values: Walras’ law does not
always hold, and merely adding quantity market clearing to commodity market
clearing is not always enough to guarantee equilibrium of the insurance payments
(in‡ows equal to out‡ows). Indeed, Helpman and La¤ont showed that insurance
markets would not clear when no other condition on the insurance contract is
imposed even if equilibrium of payments is imposed, as it is automatically when
11C = 1 and condition (2.4) is used: the sum of all insurance payments (negative or
positive) across individuals corresponding to di¤erent states and di¤erent e¤orts
is not equal to the sum of all premia paid.
Therefore we introduce two notions of equilibrium, depending on two institu-
tional arrangements on the insurance markets: a) taxes and transfers, or partici-
pation fees, or what can be seen as a pro…t-sharing arrangement without limited
liability; b) one-side constraints. The …rst notion is genuinely new to this pa-
per; one-side constraints have already been presented in the literature, and are
discussed here to compare them to the notion of equilibrium with taxes.
2.5.1. a-Equilibrium, with taxes and transfers
In this case the individuals in village h are asked to pay an amount "i
h (are o¤ered
an amount "i
h; if this is positive) to enter the insurance market. "i
h is expressed in
units of the numéraire good. Note that this is independent of bi
h being di¤erent
from zero. The exact amount will be determined in equilibrium, but is taken as
given by individuals, and is independent of e¤ort or endowment realizations. We
correspondingly introduce an opportunity set for individual h as follows.
Assumption 4a (participation fees)











C"h1 ¸ 0 ;for all shg
where "h = ("1
h;::;"
Ih
h ). Let " = ("h)h2H.
An equilibrium is now an array (x;b;q;p;") such that:
a) type-h individuals solve 2.2 subject to Ba(eh;rh;qh;p); for all k;



















for all i 2 Ih; all h.
c) expectations are rational, that is, µ
2
h satis…es (2.3) for all h.
2.5.2. b-Equilibrium, with one-side constraints
We consider restrictions imposing that individuals seeking insurance cannot short-
sell the contract.












h ¡ qh)bh ¸ 0 ;for all sh;and bh ¸ 0g
Then the equilibrium is de…ned as an array (x;b;q;p;µ) such that:
a) type-h individuals solve 2.2 subject to Bb(eh;rh;qh;p); for all k;


















for all i 2 Ih; all h, and;
c) expectations on µ
k
h are rational, as before.
No further condition is imposed on the equilibrium variables, in particular no
upper bounds on asset holdings. Note that the similar restriction of bh · 0 could
also be imposed.
A few remarks are worth making at this point about the two equilibria.









h bh + pCb0
h ¸ 0; all sh
ignoring the extra features which distinguish a- and b-Equilibria. We have in-
troduced a …ctitious risk-free asset 0; with price normalized to one. This asset
plays the role of a pooling asset. The decomposition shows that an insurance con-
tract always corresponds to bundling an individual contract and a pooled, riskfree
contract.
Second, when Ih = Sh ¡ 1, all h, then each individual faces complete as-
set markets, as Sh ¡ 1 nonredundant insurance markets correspond to Sh = Ih
nonredundant standard asset markets. So if these contracts are Arrow securities,





in general here this may not be true for at least one k, and when that is the
case individuals face a form of imperfection which makes markets ‘incomplete’,
in the sense that the full-insurance portfolio, although desirable - full-information
e¢cient -, will not be attained in equilibrium.
13Third, when interpreting the contracts as been o¤ered by an independent
intermediary, implicitly we consider here contracts between a principal (the in-
surance, exchange or market maker) and the agents (the individuals), such that
the principal has no bargaining power and gets a reservation utility level, equal
to zero expected utility in b-Equilibria and to "i
h in a-Equilibria. This setup may
correspond to a principal o¤ering a pro…t-maximizing contract in the case where
each agent is exclusively engaged ex post with one principal only, and there is
a large number of competing principals. The expectation consistency condition
(2.3) would then be akin to incentive compatibility. These contracts would not
necessarily satisfy an individual rationality condition, an issue further discussed
in Sections 4 and 5.1. A fully blown-out model of competition among principals
goes beyond the current scope of this paper.
Finally, the reader will notice the analogy of taxes in the a-Equilibrium with
similar arrangements imposed in competitive equilibrium with nonconvex produc-
tion sets and marginal cost pricing. This analogy is due to the nonconvexity at
the preference level (through discrete e¤ort choice); but this can also be seen as
nonconvex production if indeed one interprets assets as technologies. This anal-
ogy is only meant to be informal and its full exploration is beyond the scope of
the present paper.
3. Existence of equilibrium
An economy will be identi…ed by an array




of endowments, probabilities, payo¤ matrices and utilities, everything else being
…xed once and for all. We will show existence for all economies satisfying Assump-
tions 1 through 4a or 4b (and, in the …rst case, also satisfying a …fth condition:
see below) when Sh ¡ 1 ¸ Ih ¸ 1; using homotopy methods.













where ! 2 - is the array (e;¼;R;u;b) of endowments and probabilities (which
may not satisfy Assumption 1), asset payo¤s, utilities and lower bounds on asset








H) (which can vary across k; and can also be
negative).
Both a- and b-Equilibria, can be characterized using a system of equations
consisting of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the market clearing equations and the
rational expectations conditions. For ease of notation, we set
f
shk
































h the multiplier associated with f
shk
ih ; ¹k
h the multiplier associated with
fk
3h; and …nally ´
h and ´h the multipliers associated with the constraints µ
2
h ¸ 0
and 1 ¡ µ
2
h ¸ 0; respectively. Given our maintained assumptions, ®
shk
h > 0 and
f
shk
ih = 0; i = a;b: Using the …rst order conditions for problem 2.2, an equilibrium











h = 0; all sh;k;h (1)
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hRh(qh)[+¹k
























= 0; all h (5)
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where terms or equations in brackets are eliminated when considering an a-
Equilibrium, and those in double brackets are eliminated when considering a b-
Equilibrium. This is a system of equations with as many equations as unknowns in
the b-Equilibrium case, and with
P
hIh too many unknowns in the a-Equilibrium
case. We will show that this system of equations, denoted by ~ F(»;!) = 0; where
» is the vector of endogenous variables, has a solution. This will be done by:
a) …nding an auxiliary system F(»;!) = 0; whose solutions are also solutions
to ~ F(»;!) = 0;
15b) showing that the natural projection of F ¡1(0) onto - is proper;
c) …nding a test economy, that is an economy !¤ with a unique, regular equi-
librium, i.e. with a unique »
¤ such that F(»
¤;!¤) = 0 and such that rank of
D»F(»
¤;!¤) is full (see Lloyd [9] for the general theorem that we are applying
here, and also Smale [14]).
We …rst notice that equations (3.1.6), (3.1.7) and (3.1.7a) for c < C imply the






















where a vector xn is the vector x without its C component, and normalize the
price vector p as pC = 1.
3.1. Existence of an a-Equilibrium.
We limit ourselves here to showing existence in the case C = 1, but the assumption
on C is not essential for our proof and will be removed in a later section.
The idea of the proof is the following. Helpman and La¤ont show that the
existence problem is one of nonconvexity of preferences, or equivalently of feasi-
bility at no arbitrage prices. Each risk category in the economy, corresponding
to a di¤erent e¤ort level, generates a separate economy, but only one price is
quoted in each such economy, the vector q, and resources in the several economies
are supposed to match, hence the feasibility and arbitrage problems. In fact, we
show that once the arbitrage problem is solved, the feasibility problem also can
be solved by a system redistributing excess in‡ows or out‡ows of payments in the
…nancial contracts. The redistribution amount is determined endogenously by ".
First, we restrict - ½ R
P
h Sh
++ £h (Sh£Sh) £ R
P
h ShIh
+ £ U; where ! 2 - is
the array (e;¼;R;u) and where endowments and probabilities may not satisfy
Assumption 1. No role is played here by b; so we can ignore it without loss of
generality.
Assumption 5 (i) Let - be such that es
h = eh all s; implies ¼k
h = ¼h all k = 1;2





















16for all i 2 Ih, all h, where jj jj is the Euclidean norm. This equation will be
referred to as (3.1.8).
With Assumption 5, the set - is still path-connected, and we can construct a
(piecewise linear) homotopy between any two points (e;¼) and (e0;¼0):
Assumption 5.ii is used to guarantee that if losses arise, they can always be
redistributed without having any individual starve.
Assumption 5.i is a natural restriction in this setting, as we argue now. Sup-
pose H = 1; and drop reference to the subscript h for now. When es = e all s; this
is also the unique Pareto optimal allocation of an economy k with total resources
e. That is, (e;e;::;e) 2 RS












sk · e (3.2)
And if e is a Pareto optimal allocation, e¡" should be the optimal choice associ-
ated with the budget Ba(e;r;q;p) for each k; and for any given " (independent of
the number of assets) in any ‘natural’ extension of the one-risk-category model.
In such model (see Cass, Chichilniski and Wu (1996), e.g.), where " = 0, equation
(3.1.7) boils down to ¼ri(qi)bi = 0; or ¼R(q) = 0 if bi 6= 0 all i (dropping the h
for now). That is, insurance prices can safely be assumed to be actuarially fair.
Then if individuals are risk averse, are o¤ered a fair insurance contract, and if
they are already given a fully-insured initial allocation, they will not trade at the
optimum. In our multiple-risk-category model, this may pose a problem:
1) If Ih = Sh; equation (3.1.2) implies ®k
h = 0; clearly impossible.
2) If Ih = Sh¡1; the rank of Rh(qh) being Sh¡1; ®k
h is proportional to ®k0
h ; all
k0 from equation (3.1.2). Equation (3.1.1) implies that if xsk
h is constant across s;
®k
h is proportional to ¼k
h: On the other hand, from Assumption 1 ¼k
h 6= ¼k0
h when
k0 6= k; and optimal consumption cannot be constant for some k0; no matter what
Rh or eh is.
3) When insurance opportunities are incomplete, so that Ih < Sh¡1, the space
of ®k
h such that equation (3.1.2) is satis…ed has dimension greater than one, hence
in principle there are payo¤ matrices Rh for which ¼k
hRh(qh) = 0 all k: However,
the constant consumption vector may not be individually feasible if endowments
are di¤erent, even if prices qh exist at which ¼k
hRh(qh) = 0. When endowments do
not vary across states, the optimal choice is not necessarily a state-independent
consumption because again a unique no arbitrage price for di¤erent categories of
risk may not exist, or (3.1.2) may not have a solution for some k:
In particular, notice that in the canonical case where rs
h is strictly monotonic
17in s, ¼k
hrh ¡ qh = 0 implies ¼k
hrh ¡ qh 6= 0 for all k0 6= k; given Assumption 1.i,
independently of the number of assets. So in such case one should not expect asset
prices to be fair for all k, although no arbitrage can still be guaranteed, since no
individual is risk neutral.
All this discussion points to the unpleasant feature that Pareto optimal allo-
cations are not equilibria of the model. Assumption 5.i is made to circumvent
this problem. Assumption 5.i is also an innocuous restriction for the economic
interpretation of the model, because the economies we are interested in satisfy the
assumption es 6= es0 if s 6= s0.
Let F(»;!) = 0 represent system (3.1.1-8) (without equation 2a, of course,
and without equation 7a, implied by 7 by Walras’ law, since C = 1): Here » =
(x;®;b;µ
2;´;´;q;"). A solution to F(»;!) = 0 is also a solution to ~ F(»;!) = 0,
which when ! satisfy Assumption 1 is a b-equilibrium. This takes care of step a)
of our degree proof.
Now we pick a test economy !¤. For each h; choose e 2 R; with e > 1;
choose ¼h = ¼ and Rh = R all h and such that E(ri
h) ´ ¼ri < e; in accordance
with Assumption 5, and that V ar(ri
h) > E(ri
h); all i, while Cov(ri
h;r
j
h) = 0 for all
i;j 2 Ih, i 6= j: For instance, if H = 1 = I; and S = 2; choose ¼ 2 S such that ¼ =
(3=4;1=4); pick r = (:183503;3:44949). Finally, let uh(x) = (1+e)x¡x2=2 for ´1 <
x · e + ´2; and ´j > 0; j = 1;2, and uh(x) equal to a smooth utility function vh
pasted di¤erentiably to the quadratic before ´1 and after e+´2. We do this pasting
in the upper portion of the domain to preserve strict di¤erential monotonicity of
uh(:); and in the lower portion to guarantee the boundary condition. Then uh
satis…es all the maintained assumptions on utilities. Then let ek¤
h = e1, ¼¤k
h = ¼;
all k; Rh = R and u¤
h = uh all h: As we showed, ek¤
h is the solution to problem (3.2)
with initial resources ek
h and probabilities ¼h. Note that there are no di¤erences
in endowments, probabilities or preferences across types h; and that we consider
one problem (3.2) for each h. Writing the …rst order conditions of problem (3.2),
we have
¼sDu(xsk
h ) ¡ ¼spk
h = 0 P
s¼sxsk
h = e (3.3)
which are uniquely satis…ed by xsk
h = e and pk
h = p = 1 all s;k; and all h.
Lemma 3.1. At the test economy !¤; there is a unique equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix [Here in particular we use Assumption 3.iii].
We need to check properness of the projection of F ¡1(0) onto -.
18Lemma 3.2. The projection pr : F ¡1(0) ! - is proper.
Proof. See the Appendix [Here in particular we make use of Assumptions 3.iii
and 5.ii].
We have then accomplished step b) of the proof. We need to establish that
our test economy, which we showed has a unique equilibrium, is regular.
Lemma 3.3. The economy !¤ is such that rank of D»F(»
¤;!¤) is full; where
F(»
¤;!¤) = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix [Here in particular we use the asset-by-asset price
normalization].
These facts lead to the key statement of the paper.
Theorem 3.4. For any economy (e;¼;R;u) satisfying Assumptions 1 through 4a
and 5, an a-Equilibrium exists.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that deg2(F!;f0g) is homotopy invariant,
and that we can always …nd a homotopy between any (e;¼;R;u) satisfying our as-
sumptions and !¤ = (e¤;¼¤;R¤;u¤); while deg2(F!¤;f0g) = 1; since this economy
!¤ displays a unique, regular equilibrium.
3.2. Existence of a b-Equilibrium
In this case b
k
h = 0, all k;h, f
k;i





h = 0 imply equations




h = 0. So if one substitutes quantity asset market clearing for equation
(3.1.7), one still gets a b-Equilibrium, although with no trade. Therefore, one
way to solve for equilibrium in this economy is to show existence of a no trade
equilibrium, that is an equilibrium where bk
h = 0 all k;h, as this implies bk




In the case of C = 1, the proof follows a straightforward logic. Substituting
bk
h = 0, all k;h in system (3.1) after we swap equation (3.1.7) with quantity asset
market clearing, we use equation (3.1.6) to get x
s;k
h = es



















h = 0 (3.4)
19and ¹k
h ¸ 0, all k;h (from equation (3.1.2a). All other equations in (3.1) are now
satis…ed, with the exception of (3.4). Note that these equations are in number
2I for each h; while the unknowns are 3I (qh and ¹h). The values of qh and











h)]; and let k¤
h(i) = argmaxk e ¼
k
hri
h. We can …x
qi
h = maxk e ¼
k
hri
h; and then solve (3.4) by setting ¹
i;k¤
h = 0; and ¹
i;k




for k 6= k¤. This shows that all the equations at a no trade equilibrium are
satis…ed. Hence we have the following existence result.
Theorem 3.5. For any economy (e;¼;r;u) satisfying Assumptions 1 through 4b,
when C = 1 a b-Equilibrium exists with no trade.
Notice that the equilibria we obtain always involve no …nancial trade.
3.3. Extensions
C > 1
This case must be accomodated by choosing state utilities at the test econ-
omy which compound a symmetric, logarithmic function of commodities with the
quadratic component for wealth. In particular, for a-Equilibrium, compose the
linear-quadratic state utility at the test economy uh : R ! R with the function
wh : RC




h; all h. Now modify the test
economy by choosing the distribution of endowments es
h = (e;::;e) 2 RC
++ for all
s;h, where e 2 R++ is chosen as before. This way one easily sees that the unique













csk · e (3.5)
for each h is given by xcsk
h = e, with Kuhn-Tucker multipliers p = 1. This is also
seen to be the unique solution to system (3.1) when utilities and endowments are
speci…ed as indicated, and ¼;R are chosen as before. The rest of the argument
now follows immediately from what done in the previous case, with minor compu-
tational di¤erences which are left to the reader, and ends the proof of existence of
an a- Equilibrium for the general case. For a b-Equilibrium, the logic is the same
as the one presented in the one-commodity case: we look for no trade equilibria on
…nancial markets. In essence, a symmetric test economy using loglinear utilities
is selected as indicated above, and the rest of the argument is standard: see for
instance Citanna and Villanacci [4] (Theorem 4.1), where a similar no …nancial
20asset economy was selected. To map that existence proof into this case, one has
to add the exact same reasoning explained in the one-commodity case to solve for
equation (3.1.2) and (3.1.2a), with ®k
h given, and with prices qh and multipliers
¹k
h chosen as before.
4. Properties of an a-Equilibrium
In this section we make apreliminary comparison ofa-Equilibriumand b-Equilibrium
when C = 1. We also determine a generic result on the use of the …nancial
markets in an a-Equilibrium. The choice of limiting the welfare comparison to
the one-commodity case is for abstraction from relative commodity price e¤ects.
Even when C = 1 the comparison is not straightforward even for the no trade
b-Equilibrium, which always exists in these economies according to Theorem 3.5.
Indeed, in an a-Equilibrium from the individual’s perspective no trading leaves
him with the endowment minus the admission fee and not simply with his endow-
ment, as in the no trade b-Equilibrium.
However, when C = 1 observe that at an a-Equilibrium the utility for each


























Now suppose that at the equilibrium µ
k






















for that k. Notice that the individual has added a zero-mean random variable,
Rh(qh)bk
h ¡ E[Rh(qh)bk
h], to his endowment. Moreover, if the individual is worse
o¤ at the equilibrium than with his own endowment, this random variable must
be a mean-preserving spread. But through the choice of bk
h; this random variable
is actually reducing the endowment risk, by risk aversion, so the individual must
be no worse o¤ than with his own endowment given k.
If µ
k

























21and again consumption is given by endowment plus a zero-mean random variable,
which the individual controls reducing the endowment risk, by risk aversion.
The previous paragraph obviously implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. When C = 1, an a-Equilibrium is no worse than a no trade
b-Equilibrium when the two equilibria involve the same e¤ort chosen by the in-
dividuals. If at the no trade b-Equilibrium e¤ort is low, the a-Equilibrium domi-
nates.
This shows that individuals would be willing to participate the fee (or taxa-
tion/subsidy) system, as this is individually rational despite that individuals take
it as given and are apparently ‘forced’ to participate.
The next proposition shows that …nancial markets in an a-Equilibrium are
typically active. To show the result, we assume that utilities for consumption are















that our existence theorem still applies.
Proposition 4.2. In an open and dense subset of (state- and e¤ort-dependent)
utility functions, costs of e¤ort and endowments, under the maintained assump-
tions all a-Equilibria are regular and b
i;k
h 6= 0 for some k with µ
k
h > 0, all i;h.
Proof. See the Appendix.
An immediate corollary of the proposition is the following side result: gener-
ically, nontrivial ‘entry fee’ equilibria exist in the one-commodity case. That is,
if we had considered that individuals pay a …xed fee only if they trade (dubbed
‘entry fee’), as opposed to paying no matter what the individual bh is, we would
have obtained equilibria for a generic set of economies as well. The next section
shows how the individual rationality requirement can be imposed on the taxation
scheme to obtain general existence with no substantial extra di¢culty.
5. Equilibria with ‘entry fees’
We can modify the previous analysis in order to study the pure ‘entry fee’ system
(see the conjecture in Bisin and Gottardi [3]). In this system, the equilibrium
looks like an a-Equilibrium, except that "i is paid only if bik
h 6= 0, some k. We …rst
modify the budget constraint.
Assumption 6 (entry fees)






















h 6= 0; and zero otherwise.
Then an equilibrium with entry fees is now an array (x;b;q;p;") such that:
a) type-h individuals solve 2.2 subject to Be(eh;rh;qh;p); for all k;





















h )] = 0
for all i 2 Ih; all h.
c) expectations are rational, that is, µ
2
h satis…es (2.3) for all h.
Note that "i
h is not paid as a function of the e¤ort exerted, only contingent
upon the type h individual’s choice of trading asset i being nonzero.
Despite the apparent nonconvexity of the budget constraint Be, we can apply
the same degree techniques that we employed above. This is accomplished as
follows. For every price vector (p;qh) and fees "h; we consider type h’s individual
optimization problem as if the individual faced taxes "i
h, independent of bi
h, for
all i, and then compare the indirect utility at this optimum with the indirect
utility at an optimum where the individual cannot use asset i; and faces no fees
on that asset, for the same prices. This we do for all combinations of assets (in
number I on 2; therefore …nitely many). We then select the trading strategy
yielding the highest indirect utility. We put a weight equal to one to such utility-
maximizing trading choice, and zero to all the others, or equal and arbitrary
weights between zero and one included if there are multiple utility-maximizing
strategies. We interpret these weights once again as proportions of individuals of
type h choosing a certain trading strategy. It is immediate to see that a solution
to this multiple trading strategy problem is also a solution to the original single
problem where "i
h(0) = 0.
In order to illustrate the technique, we consider the simpli…ed problem of
comparing two possible trading strategies: either the individual pays the fee for
using all the assets, or no fee is paid and the individual chooses not to trade on
…nancial markets.











h = 0; j = 0;1, all sh;k;h (1)
pC®k1
















































= 0; all h (5a)
f
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where j = 0 corresponds to no …nancial trading, and j = 1 to (possibly) trading
all assets, and variables are indexed accordingly. Equations (3) to (5) denote the
choice of e¤ort in the two trading cases. Equation (6a) is the budget constraint
under zero trading on …nancial markets. µ
0
h is the proportion of individuals choos-
ing not to trade, and therefore not paying any fee. The market clearing equations
(7) and (7a) have been correspondingly modi…ed. t is a homotopy parameter.
For t = 0, equations (3a) to (5a) express the condition that if no trading gives














To show existence of equilibria with entry fee, we perform the very same steps
we went through earlier, even in the choice of the test economy. Hence we can
establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. For any economy (e;¼;r;u) satisfying Assumptions 1 through
3, 5 and 6, an equilibrium with entry fees exists.
Proof. Properness (Lemma 3.2) goes through virtually unchanged. We
compute the degree at the test economy when t > 0; say t = 1. Since at




h = e, and ¼k
h = ¼h; all h, µ
2j









h = 0 all µ
kj
h , all j;h; hence t = 1 implies µ
0
h = 0; and we are
24back to the previous computations of Lemma 3.1. Finally, the proof of regularity
is identical to that of Lemma 3.3. Since deg2 is t¡homotopy invariant, we are
done.
Note that by construction these equilibria are always individually rational.
256. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1
In (3.3), identifying ®sk
h = ¼spk we see that equation (3.1.1) is satis…ed if
xsk
h = ek
h; and equation (3.1.2) is also satis…ed by choosing qh = ¼hRh; all h:
Then equation (3.1.6) is 1"h = (rs
h ¡ qh)bk
h; all s; which implies bk
h = 0 = 1"h; all
k;h since rank of Rh(qh) is Ih by Assumption 3.iii: Then from equation (3.1.7),
"i
h = 0 uniquely, again for all h. Note that equation (3.1.1) is satis…ed also by
setting xsk
h = ek
h ¡ 1"h and ®sk
h = ¼s~ pk where ~ pk is the multiplier for problem
(3.2) with total resources ek




h = 0; all k;h and therefore "h = 0 from equation
(3.1.7). This shows that at e¤ the solution xsk
h = ek
h; ®sk
h = ¼spk and bk
h = 0 = ";
all k; is unique when qh = ¼hRh.
Suppose then that qi
h 6= ¼hri
h; some i;h (or equivalently, that ®k
h is not pro-
portional to ¼). Then, xk
h cannot be constant across states, and bk
h 6= 0; all k:
More precisely, bk
h = b for all k; since all problems k;h are identical: Dropping the



























































which implies qi = ¼ri or qi = ¼ri(bi2¡1)=(1+bi2) < ¼ri; and jbij > 1 since qi > 0
from equation (3.1.2) and ®k À 0 and ri > 0.
Now substituting ®sk = ¼sDu(xsk) into equation (3.1.2) and using the linear-




s(1 + e ¡ x
s)(r



















s + qe = 0
where the last term comes from commodity market clearing (recall once again
that all groups h are identical). Substituting for xs from equations (3.1.6), we
have






2b + ¼rqb + ¼r1I0" + qe = 0
where I0 is the subset of i with qi¼ri; and 1I0 is a corresponding vector of ones.
Substituting for " and using the notation for averages and variances, we have that

































27since E(ri)=V ar(ri) < 1: Its solutions bi are such that jbij < 1, hence qi < 0; which
by equation (3.1.2) cannot be. Hence, the only solution is qi = E(ri); all i; and
the solution found in this case is unique, as we wanted to show. By choice of e¤,
and since a1
h < a2
h; we have U1
h > U2
h; all h, which in turn implies µ
2




h using (3.1.3-5). Now ¼r = jjqjj; hence (3.1.8) is also satis…ed.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
We take a sequence f!ng
1
n=1 ½ - such that !n ! ! 2 -: We need to show
that »
n ! » = 2 @¥ where F(»
n;!n) = 0 and @¥ is the boundary of the domain of
the endogenous variables. We will say then that f»
ng Converges.
From equations (3.1.4-5), µ
2n
h 2 [0;1]; all n; so it Converges to µ
2
h . Then from
equation (3.1.8) we have that both qh and "h Converge.
Suppose that µ
2
h = 1; all h. By choice of - (Assumption 5.ii); jj"hjj < es
h,







h]; all n: Looking
at equations (3.1.1), using the price normalization and the boundary condition
(which for C = 1 it is Dusk
h ! 1 when xsk
h ! 0), we then have that fxs2n
h g
Converges. Then again using equations (3.1.1) and the price normalization, f®s2n
h g
Converges. Moreover, since ®s2
h À 0; r
s;i
h ¡ qi




for some s0 6= s; all i;h. From equation (3.1.6) for k = 2 and Assumption 3.iii
we get that fb2n
h g Converges. Second, looking at equations (3.1.6) for k = 1;
we easily see that fxs1n
h g is bounded from above. Indeed, if xs1n
h ! 1 and
there is some i with r
s;i
h ¡ qi
h > 0, necessarily bi1n
h ! 1; so jjb1n
h jj ! 1: Then
b1n
h =jjb1n
h jj ! b1
h 6= 0, and dividing both sides of (3.1.6) by jjb1n




h ¸ 0. Now, it cannot be that Rh(qh)b1
h > 0 since in
the limit ®2
hRh(qh) = 0 and this implies that there is no b such that the previous
inequality holds. On the other hand, Rh(qh)b1
h = 0 and rank of Rh(qh) = Ih imply
that b1
h = 0; a contradiction. So xs1n
h 2 [0;M], for some M, all n; and once again
it Converges using pC = 1, the boundary condition and equation (3.1.1). Then we
can show that fb1n
h g Converges. Finally, since U2n
h ¡ U1n






hg. Indeed, suppose not. Then if one goes to in…nity, so does the other.
But from equations (3.1.4-5) we have µ
2
h = 1 ¡ µ
2
h = 0, impossible. Then they
Converge.
Analogous reasoning applies for the case when µ
2
h = 0; all h. In all other cases,
including if µ
2










Proof of Lemma 3.3
28We need to show that D»F(»
¤;!¤)¢» = 0 implies ¢» = 0. First we write this



















h ¡ ¢´h = 0 (3)
¢µ
2
h = 0 (4)


















h = 0: (8)
From (3.1.8), at !¤; qh = ¼R; so that from (7) we have ¢"h = 0; and from
(8); ¢qi











h = 0: From
(2); ¢bk
hRT(qh)¢®k














h = 0; all k: Now if for any k; ¢xk
h 6= 0, by strict









h < 0; a contradiction. Then
¢xk
h = 0; all k; which implies ¢®k
h = 0 using (1); and ¢bk
h = 0 using (6); and
¢´
h = 0 using (3); showing that ¢» = 0: So D»F(»
¤;!¤) has full rank, completing
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
We …rst want to show regularity of a-Equilibria, that is, we want to show
that the rank of the derivative of system (3.1), equations from (1) to (8) as in
an a-Equilibrium, with respect to the endogenous variables is full. To do so, we
apply a standard transversality argument, and …rst show that the rank is full
using perturbations of endogenous and exogenous variables. To start with, let the











where pn is the commodity price vector without pC. Let ° = (uh;a2
h;eh)H
h=1 be
the vector of exogenous variables, and let D»;°F(»;°) be the derivative. Assume
for now that we are not at the ‘corner’ of the minimum functions in equations (4)
and (5). The independent perturbations are summarized below:










h see below ¢x
s;k;c
h ; c 6= C see below
29where ¢ denotes a vector in the tangent space, ¢u
s;k
h is a perturbation of the
utility gradient (note that the state and e¤ort dependence avoids taking care of




h for some s;k and s0;k0), and ¢a2
h is a perturbation of
the cost of the second e¤ort, possibly used in (3); namely if ´
h = ´h = 0 at an
equilibrium. As for (7) and (8); we work the perturbation according to whether
"i
h = 0 or not. If "i
h = 0; then we perturb (7) with "i




h > 0 for all i;k;h by Assumption 3.ii, k(qi
h;"i
h)k 6= 0 and qi
h 6= 0. If "i
h 6= 0,
there exists a k such that µ
k





h 6= 0. Hence we perturb (7)
with such a b
i;k
h ; and (8) with "i
h. The perturbations show that D»;°F(»;°) has full
rank. Now we apply a transversality theorem (see Abraham et al. [1], Theorem.
3.6.15) to conclude that in an open and dense subset of utilities, costs of e¤orts
and endowments D»F(»;°) also has full rank, showing regularity of a-Equilibria.
Economies where equilibria correspond to ´
h = µ
2
h = 0 or to ´h = 1 ¡ µ
2
h = 0;
that is, corners in equations (4) and (5) are also nongeneric. This can be shown
in a standard way: appending ´
h = 0 and µ
2
h = 0 to (3.1), we can throw away
equation (4); and then proceed with perturbations as above, perturbing these two
equations in the obvious way. Again, the rank of the derivative matrix is full, but
now notice that the number of equations exceeds that of the unknowns by one,
hence by transversality in an open and dense subset of the parameters there are
no ‘corner’ solutions. The same can be said for the case when ´h = 1 ¡ µ
2
h = 0.
Now, we prove that b
i;k
h 6= 0 for some k with µ
k
h > 0; all i;h; in an open and
dense subset of parameters. First note that if "i
h 6= 0, some i;h, then we know
that there exists k with µ
k
h > 0 and such that b
i;k
h 6= 0; and we are done. Hence
suppose that "i
h = 0 all i;h. Then append the equation b
i;k
h = 0, some i;k;h to
the system of equations (1) through (8). The system can be still perturbed as
outlined above, and this last equation can be perturbed using b
i;k
h , which we have
not used otherwise, then we have that the derivative of the system including this
extra equation has full rank. Again, a round of transversality shows that in an
open and dense subset of economies, all equilibria have the property b
i;k
h 6= 0 for
some i;k;h if "i
h = 0. Repeating the argument for all i;k;h we get that in an
open and dense subset of economies, all equilibria have the property b
i;k
h 6= 0 for
some i;k;h if "i
h = 0, and b
i;k
h for k with µ
k
h > 0; all i;h if "i
h 6= 0, concluding the
proof.
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